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I. Introduction
The beginnings of the debate on the role of luck in morality, and the intro-
duction of the expression “moral luck”, go back to the articles by Williams and 
Nagel published in the 1970s. Before delving into the details of the problem, 
however, one should examine a few aspects associated with luck. 
Firstly, it needs to be explored what a given philosopher understands under 
the concept of luck. Secondly, it must be established whether a particular phi-
losopher believes that luck impacts human life – including people’s moral ef-
forts. In other words, it is pertinent to determine if moral luck perceived as this 
very type of interaction is incorporated in the philosophical framework. Third-
ly, it should be assessed whether moral luck existing in a particular framework 
of thought represents a conceptual problem which is verbalized and expected 
to be resolved in some way. It may happen, as the line of argument below 
demon strates, that some philosophers embrace the idea that luck aﬀ ects moral-
ity, however without exploring the association as a separate problem, as op-
posed to Nagel and Williams. 
The works by Nagel and Williams have proven to be so seminal because 
they propose that luck plays a major role in moral assessment. Based on the 
dictionary deﬁ nition, luck refers to “the good or bad things that happen to 
a person in the course of events (as if) by chance; fate; fortune”.1 However, the 
1 Deﬁ nition of “luck” in: Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. New Edition, War-
saw 1990, p. 624.
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word sometimes tends to be interpreted in a more narrow sense, i.e. ﬁ rst and 
foremost as good fortune or prosperity. In the forthcoming sections, luck is 
deemed to refer to the chance happening of both fortunate and adverse events, 
i.e. in a broad sense. The notion of luck is usually used to describe unexpect-
ed events or occurrences beyond anyone’s control. The role of moral luck in-
volves the negation of an important element of evaluation: control over one’s 
actions. It seems obvious that no person can be held accountable for their ac-
tions, if they were involuntary and not controllable. In Nagel’s view, however, 
moral luck reveals that such an evaluation is performed. Consequently, the 
philosopher calls into question the sense of moral assessment as such. 
Nagel proposes the following deﬁ nition of moral luck: “where a signiﬁ cant 
aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we 
continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be 
called moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad”.2
A classic literary example of moral luck is the fate that befalls King Oedipus 
from Sophocles’ play. Oedipus commits his wrongful deeds unwittingly. In fact, 
it must be noted, he becomes an instrument of evil despite his struggle to avoid 
evil. Unfortunately, as fate dictates, his actions lead to evil consequences.
The philosophical debate relies on slightly diﬀ erent examples, though. 
They include the truck driver who, driving at an excessive speed, involuntar-
ily runs over a child, or a ﬁ ctionalized Gauguin who chooses a life of painting 
over a life with his wife and children. In the discussion below, the majority of 
references are to the example with the truck driver. It is simpler because, as 
opposed Williams’ Gaugin example, the loss of life or health is an irrefutably 
wrong act – contrary to artistic accomplishments which are diﬃ  cult to classify 
and evaluate in objective terms. 
Before embarking on further discussions on the topic of moral luck, it ap-
pears useful to quote the following diﬀ erentiation proposed by Nagel:
The driver, if he is entirely without fault, will feel terrible about his role in the 
event, but will not have to reproach himself. Therefore this example of agent-
regret is not yet a case of moral bad luck. However, if the driver was guilty of 
even a minor degree of negligence – failing to have his brakes checked recently, 
for example – then if that negligence contributes to the death of the child, he will 
not merely feel terrible. He will blame himself for the death. And what makes this 
an example of moral luck is that he would have to blame himself only slightly for 
the negligence itself if no situation arose which required him to brake suddenly 
and violently to avoid hitting a child. Yet the negligence is the same in both cases, 
and the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his path.3 
2 T. Nagel, Moral Luck, in: Moral Luck, ed. D. Statman, New York 1993, p. 59.
3 Ibid, p. 61.
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In this context, it is essential to make a clear distinction between a situa-
tion in which an unfortunate event occurs without anyone’s fault, and moral 
luck, which describes circumstances involving a certain relationship (usually 
causality) between previous actions and their fortunate – or unfortunate – con-
sequences.
The literature includes many attempts to classify moral luck. As Nagel 
points out:
There are roughly four ways in which the natural objects of moral assessment are 
disturbingly subject to luck. One is the phenomenon of constitutive luck – the kind 
of person you are, where this is not just a question of what you deliberately do, 
but of your inclinations, capacities, and temperament. Another category is luck in 
one’s circumstances – the kind of problems and situations one faces. The other two 
have to do with the causes and eﬀ ects of action: luck in how one is determined by 
antecedent circumstances, and luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out.4
The category of constitutive luck is also mentioned by Williams.5 How-
ever, the scholar also makes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck. 
He emphasizes that 
the intrinsic luck in Gauguin’s case concentrates itself on virtually the one ques-
tion of whether he is a genuinely gifted painter who can succeed in doing genu-
inely valuable work. Not all the conditions of the project’s coming oﬀ  lie in him, 
obviously, since others’ actions and refrainings provide many necessary condi-
tions of its coming oﬀ  – and that is an important locus of extrinsic luck. But the 
conditions of its coming oﬀ  which are relevant to unjustiﬁ cation, the locus of in-
trinsic luck, largely lie in him – which is not to say, of course, that they depend on 
his will, though some may.6 
It thus follows that intrinsic luck is a derivative of the internal features 
of the agent – a result of him possessing a particular characteristic or con-
dition. It cannot always be equated with constitutive luck. The latter is a set 
of factors stemming from the nature and environment in which the agent is 
born – or from his purely biological endowment which may have a bearing on 
behaviour. Constitutive luck is not always equivalent to intrinsic luck. Certain 
environmental inﬂ uences, such as getting a better or worse education, may 
partially be classiﬁ ed under the term of extrinsic luck. Intrinsic luck cannot be 
equated with constitutive luck, either. After all, certain features of character 
4 Ibid, p. 60.
5 B. Williams, Moral Luck, in: idem, Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge 1981, p. 21.
6 B. Williams, Moral Luck, in: op. cit., p. 26.
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may change, which means that they elude the criterion of constitutiveness con-
ceived of as something pre-existing. It can be seen, then, that the distinctions 
proposed by Nagel and Williams overlap to a certain extent, however they can-
not be equated, since they are an eﬀ ect of divergent criteria of diﬀ erentiation. 
In the most essential terms, the guiding principle is that one should not cast 
blame or give credit to anyone in situations where the person concerned has 
no control over the circumstances. According to Nagel, however, aside from 
events in which the lack of control precludes any moral judgment, there are 
also cases in which we morally assess agents for things depending on factors 
that are not, in fact, in their control:
However jewel-like the good will may be in its own right, there is a morally sig-
niﬁ cant diﬀ erence between rescuing someone from a burning building and drop-
ping him from a twelfth-story window while trying to rescue him. Similarly, there 
is a morally signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between reckless driving and manslaughter. But 
whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedes-
trian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. What we do is also limited 
by the opportunities and choices with which we are faced, and these are largely 
determined by factors beyond our control. Someone who was an oﬃ  cer in a con-
centration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never 
come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in 
Argentina might have become an oﬃ  cer in a concentration camp if he had not left 
Germany for business reasons in 1930.7
Going further, people are judged for what they actually did rather than for 
what they would have done had the circumstances been diﬀ erent.8 The driv-
er who drove too fast with defective brakes in his truck and ran over a child 
that accidentally ran onto the road is judged to be more morally blameworthy 
than the driver who, under the same initial circumstances, did not run over 
anyone. What the examples above show is that an uneven judgment cannot 
be eliminated, as it would breach the principle stating that whoever did more 
evil deserves a more severe judgment.9 As Nagel claims, moral luck is the 
factor which provides an element of diﬀ erence with respect to the eﬀ ects, cir-
cumstances and causes.10 What is more, constitutive luck, deﬁ ning the agent’s 
characteristics, inclinations, abilities and temperament, makes the determined 
“accidentality” of the deed even more conspicuous,11 for it describes human 
 7 T. Nagel, Moral Luck, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
 8 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
 9 N. Richards, Luck and Desert, in: Moral Luck, ed. D. Statman, New York 1993, p. 168.
10 T. Nagel, Moral Luck, op. cit., p. 59.
11 Ibid., p. 60.
 PROBLEM OF RELATION BETWEEN LUCK AND MORALITY… 113
personality and will, and in this way aﬀ ects the consequences of actions. Also, 
due note should be taken of Nagel’s argument that: “It may be true of someone 
that in a dangerous situation he would behave in a cowardly or heroic fashion, 
but if the situation never arises, he will never have the chance to distinguish or 
disgrace himself in this way, and his moral record will be diﬀ erent”.12
The above line of argument, Nagel argues, leads to a paradox which is thus 
described by Richards: “On the one hand, it requires that matters beyond one’s 
control can have no bearing on one’s deserts. On the other, it requires that they 
have enormous bearing after all”.13 
Consequently, Nagel draws attention to the fact that the nature of moral 
judgements appears problematic. The problem is formulated in the following 
manner: 
If the condition of control is consistently applied, it threatens to erode most of 
the moral assessments we ﬁ nd it natural to make. The things for which people 
are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at ﬁ rst realize by what 
is beyond their control. And when the seemingly natural requirement of fault or 
responsibility is applied in light of these facts, it leaves few pre-reﬂ ective moral 
judgments intact. Ultimately, nothing or almost nothing about what a person does 
seems to be under his control.14 
If Nagel’s line of argument is accepted – along with its emphasis on de-
terminism – it follows that people are not in actual fact responsible for their 
deeds. Human actions are a corollary of previous states and coincidences of 
events in which we participate. Moral luck accentuates the state of the human 
moral condition. If this line of thinking is embraced, culpability as an eﬀ ect 
of causative responsibility for the perpetration of evil ceases to be based on 
responsibility. Therefore, upon a closer look, we are not in fact responsible 
for our actions – at least not in the sense of voluntary agency which is a com-
monly recognized condition for the attribution of causative responsibility for 
a particular deed. Nagel proceeds to outlining even more far-reaching conse-
quences. If we are determined by constitutive luck, even our will is predeter-
mined. What this means is that our exercise of will ceases to be “free will”. 
As a result, it is diﬃ  cult to establish whether autonomy and potential respon-
sibility for actions exist at all “because the self which acts and is the object of 
moral judgment is threatened with dissolution by the absorption of its acts and 
impulses into the class of events”.15 
12 Ibid., p. 65.
13 N. Richards, Luck and Desert, op. cit., p. 168.
14 T. Nagel, Moral Luck, op. cit., p. 59.
15 Ibid., p. 67.
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Consequently, he argues, “nothing remains which can be ascribed to the re-
sponsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence 
of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised”.16 
Even the existence of “the self” then becomes problematic.17 For the con-
temporary analysis would be worthy to review, what about luck thought an-
cient philosophers. This is purpose of the present paper. 
The paper traces the relationship between luck and morality back to an-
cient philosophical thought, exploring the ideas proposed by Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics.
II. Luck in Plato’s philosophy
The problem of how people’s fate, though not necessarily their morality, 
is aﬀ ected by luck can be found in the ﬁ rst literary works which are of fun-
damental importance for the European civilization. The life histories of Paris 
and Helen, Achilles and Agamemnon, and Odysseus and Penelope, were de-
termined by Olympian Gods and the Moirai – the Three Fates controlling the 
metaphorical thread of life. The fate of Oedipus shows that Ananke is able 
to trap a protagonist – who is otherwise capable of solving the Sphinx’s rid-
dle – in an unending labyrinth of guilt with no way out. As opposed to the 
wanderings of Agamemnon’s ﬂ eet of ships or the spell cast on Paris, the laby-
rinth was moral in character. Oedipus, led imperiously by blind fate, commits 
a crime in good faith, for which, in an act of tragic irony, he ultimately blinds 
himself.
A broader and more in-depth analysis of literary references to fate can be 
found in the book by Martha Nussbaum entitled “The Fragility of Goodness: 
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy”. The work is an exten-
sive review of the struggle of ancient Greek literature and philosophy with the 
problem of destiny, luck or chance. The publication paints a picture of a world 
where the impact of luck on human existence cannot be refuted. However, 
it seeks to ﬁ nd a remedy: a way not to surrender to chance, to minimize the 
role of luck or identify a portion of a human being which is luck-independent. 
Greek tragedy authors tended to emphasize the dramatic side of human exist-
ence, and fate was often given the face of gods. Chance, luck, fate – all of 
them aﬄ  icted people through frequently astonishing decisions of godly beings 
or social factors which were largely beyond human control. The fate of So-
phocles’ Antigone, Nussbaum argues, is meant to show that human life stands 
16 T. Nagel, Moral Luck, op. cit., p. 68.
17 Ibid.
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on the edge of fate, well-established social conventions should be followed, 
and fundamental human values are not free from the inﬂ uence of destiny.18 
The above also applies to fate which brings the social conventions and values 
into conﬂ ict. Religious myths and rituals were meant to entreat deities to give 
people good fortune, not adversity. Philosophical reﬂ ection, in turn, attempted 
to identify not divine interventions but rather the intrinsic character of fate and 
ways to shield oneself from its impact: both in terms of circumstances which 
pose a risk to life and health, and situations generating social conﬂ icts, includ-
ing those that aﬀ ect the ethicality of human life. 
In Plato’s “Protagoras”, human life is, by nature, completely dependent on 
fate (Greek touche). Due to the fact that Epimetheus distributed traits among 
animals and humans without any foresight, people are exposed to the mercy 
of elements and beasts. Fortunately, Prometheus endowed humans with a set 
of basic skills including technai (techniques, arts) which help people stand 
up to fate. These additional skills, often acquired through eﬀ ort and practice, 
aid people in achieving partial independence of luck. Furthermore, they sup-
port humans in attaining self-suﬃ  ciency. The aspect of techne – and know-
ledge which is intended to lead to technical skills such as measuring, counting 
or weighing, which are important in the struggle with fate – is stressed by 
Nussbaum.19 The author claims that the notion of techne is mutually inter-
changeable in Plato, and in even in Aristotle, with the concept of episteme.20 
The operations of measuring and counting referred to above are derivatives of 
a broader intellectual activity called philosophy. Philosophy, in turn, seeks not 
only natural things, but ever since Socrates’ times, it has been searching for 
a formula for good human life. Measuring, counting or searching for a formula 
are based on pinpointing the constancy which stands in opposition to vari-
ability dictated by blind fate. It is in constancy that Plato seeks a remedy for 
the changeability and randomness of human existence. It is no wonder, then, 
18 M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Phi-
losophy, Cambridge 2001, p. 89. 
19 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
20 “The word «techne»’ is translated in several ways: «craft», «art», and «science» are the most 
frequent. Examples of recognized technai include items that we would call by each of these three 
names. There are house-building, shoemaking, and weaving; horsemanship, ﬂ ute-playing, dancing, 
acting, and poetry-writing; medicine, mathematics, and meteorology. The Greek word is more inclu-
sive than anyone of these English terms. It is also very closely associated with the word «epistiﬂ ll», 
usually translated «knowledge», «understanding»; or «science», «body of knowledge» (depending 
on whether it is being used of the known or of the cognitive condition of the knower). In fact, to 
judge from my own work and in the consensus of philologists, there is, at least through Plato’s time, 
no systematic or general distinction between episteme and techne. Even in some of Aristotle’s most 
important writings on this topic, the two terms are used interchangeably. This situation obtains in the 
Protagoras” – M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy, op. cit., p. 94.
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that the world of ideas is a non-material world, though existing in actual real-
ity in an unchanging manner, in which the human soul learns the permanent 
elements, including those safeguarding from bad conduct. What Plato consid-
ers to be the greatest threat to a morally commendable and happy life (at least 
internally) are changeable desires and passions of the soul. The rescue is in the 
ability of thinking which, searching for the truth, must be based on the modo 
geometrico of established ways of thinking and acting. Looking at Plato’s fun-
damental human faculties, or the Platonic tripartite theory of soul consisting 
of reason, spirit and appetite, it follows that only one of the parts – by nature 
– is able to enjoy consistency. It is no wonder, then, that the reasonable part of 
the soul is meant to control the remaining elements by delineating the limits 
(measures) of their inﬂ uence. In the context of fate, Nussbaum points out, Pro-
tagoras includes a thought which plays a rudimentary role for further delibera-
tions on the topic of luck, namely that shaping one’s character is possible, and 
humans carry a moral responsibility for this endeavour:
I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counsellor 
about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. 
And I will now endeavour to show further that they do not conceive this virtue 
to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be 
taught; and which comes to a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one 
would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to 
nature or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what 
they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the 
ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because he knows that 
good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if a man 
is wanting in those good qualities which are attained by study and exercise and 
teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, 
and punish and reprove him-of these evil qualities one is impiety, another injus-
tice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. 
In such cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,-clearly 
because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is deﬁ -
cient may be acquired”.21
Elsewhere, Plato highlights the problem of fair legal assessment of deeds 
committed involuntarily, including accidental actions. In the ideal state, the 
law-maker should provide for more lenient penalties to perpetrators who in-
voluntarily cause another person’s death:
21 Plato, Protagoras, tr. B. Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/protagoras.html, [accessed: 
01.12.2016].
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If any one slays a freeman with his own hand and the deed be done in passion, 
in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. For a deed is 
done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause 
the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry 
for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted 
in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not 
sorry for the act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of two 
kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean 
between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time, they are neither of them 
anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. …And we should make the 
penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and 
lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which 
is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like 
a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws.22 
Plato does not deny, therefore, that luck has an impact on people’s fate 
and morality. What he asserts, though, is that attempts should be made to con-
trol this impact with knowledge, and in the case of morality – with virtues. In 
the latter case, it is possible to achieve a complete independence from luck. 
Consequently, even in adverse external circumstances one can remain a good 
and noble person. As Nussbaum puts it, Plato endeavours to make good life 
independent of luck.23 However, the philosopher goes so far in internalizing 
being happy that he almost fails to take note of the external conditions of hap-
piness, and does not necessarily link it to morality. This is a consequence of 
searching for constancy in the world of ideas whose characteristics must also 
be embraced by a human soul derived from it. In this context, there is one 
quite remarkable passage in “Crito” which should be evoked here. It relates 
to a dream recounted to Crito by Socrates, who is already imprisoned. While 
dreaming, Socrates has a vision of a gorgeous statuesque woman dressed in 
white who, as if dashing all thoughts of escape, says to him: “O Socrates. The 
third day hence, to Phthia shalt thou go”.24 Even though, as Witwicki points 
out in his commentary, the lines recited by the woman come straight from the 
Iliad, and were originally uttered by Achilles when threatening Agamemnon 
about abandoning the war against Troy and returning home, the metaphor of 
fertility is suggestive of the Elysian Fields.25 
22 Plato, Laws, tr. B. Jowett, book IX, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.9.ix.html [accessed: 
01.12.2016].
23 D. Statman, Introduction, in: Moral Luck, ed. idem, State University of New York Press 
1993, p. 3.
24 Plato, Crito, tr. B. Jowett, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/crito.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
25 Plato, Kriton, tr. W. Witwicki, Warszawa 1984, p. 338.
118 PRZEMYSŁAW STRZYŻYŃSKI
Another aspect, emphasized by Jedan, is the fact that the date of death 
given in the dream was consistent with the anticipated date of administering 
the death penalty to Socrates.26 What follows is that Socrates had a prophetic 
dream. This, in turn, may be taken to mean that Plato did not reject the pos-
sibility of theological determinism altogether. Evidence for that claim can be 
found in one passage from “Republic” which addresses the allocation of fate 
to individual people:
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but ﬁ rst 
of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the 
knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high pulpit, 
spoke as follows: ‘Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal 
souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to 
you, but you choose your genius; and let him who draws the ﬁ rst lot have the ﬁ rst 
choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as 
a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsibil-
ity is with the chooser – God is justiﬁ ed.’ When the Interpreter had thus spoken he 
scattered lots indiﬀ erently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which 
fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot 
perceived the number which he had obtained.27 
Paradoxically, it is the passage which also addresses the concept of luck. 
As Hadot states, daimon (i.e. individual fate), which according to Plato is tied 
to every soul, is ascribed to it by luck but, at the same time, chosen by it”.28 
What is at play here is a complicated convolution of three elements. There is 
a draw which, nolens volens, involves souls voluntarily picking their numbers 
in the draw. As Witwicki states in one of the footnotes: “the Prophet presents 
those souls which are about to enter bodies and begin their life on Earth with 
sample human fates. Fate is not preordained by God, for fate may be vicious. 
God must not be blamed for any evil, so Plato prefers to believe that every in-
dividual is culpable for their own unlucky fate. This is the fate everyone picks 
before birth, and must accept. If they make a wrong choice, they have no one 
else to blame. They may complain about their own stupidity, but not the divine 
will. However, even wise people are unable to choose any fate they want, be-
cause chance plays a major role. The prophet distributes lives like draw tick-
26 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues. Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Virtues, New 
York 2009, p. 36.
27 Plato, Republic, tr. B. Jowett, book X, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.11.x.html, [ac-
cessed: 01.12.2016].
28 P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, tr. Ch. Michael, London 
1998, p. 222.
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ets, and everyone picks up the fate that lands at their feet. Tough luck”.29 The 
randomness can be seen when souls “draw lots” to determine the sequence 
of choosing ways of life which, one might presume, are varied but limited in 
their repeatability.
Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and 
there were many more lives than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. 
There were lives of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were 
tyrannies among them, some lasting out the tyrant’s life, others which broke oﬀ  in 
the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were 
lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as 
for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of 
their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite quali-
ties. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any deﬁ nite character them, 
because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of necessity become diﬀ erent. 
But there was every other quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also 
with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were mean 
states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; 
and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every 
other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he 
may be able to learn and may ﬁ nd someone who will make him able to learn and 
discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better 
life as he has opportunity. …and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the 
life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make 
his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this 
is the best choice both in life and after death.30 
One may embrace the interpretation that even though the sequence of se-
lecting typical ways of life is a result of “a draw of lots”, the samples of lives 
themselves are fully selectable. Factors inﬂ uencing the selection process in-
clude existing propensities and predispositions, character developed in the 
body throughout life, and experience (a consequence being that the status of 
souls making the selection process for the ﬁ rst time is impaired). Consequent-
ly, a certain form of choice – and a certain impact on one’s life – does in fact 
exist. However, it takes place mainly in the world of ideas. Even if, accord-
ing to the circular concept of time that was adhered to by the ancient Greeks, 
people living their lives in their bodies are able to acquire virtues and hence 
inﬂ uence the selection of another incarnation, the choice is made ultimately 
in the world of ideas. It seems that from the perspective of people living on 
29 Platon, Państwo, 617 C-E, tr. W. Witwicki, Kęty 2003, footnote 15, p. 334.
30 Plato, Republic, tr. B. Jowett, book X, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.11.x.html, [ac-
cessed: 01.12.2016].
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Earth both possibilities of inﬂ uencing their faith are rather remote and illusory. 
What dominates is the notion of living a preordained life. As Witwicki aptly 
summarizes: “Once embarked upon in the other world, the course of life is ir-
reversible and set in the steel frames of necessity, similarly to the course of the 
Universe. With respect to this world – and this life – Plato is a determinist. He 
transplanted some pretence of indeterminism into the period before people’s 
birth”.31 One can agree that it is actually a question of appearances. How, then, 
can determinism be reconciled with previously discussed passages addressing 
the topics of accidental guilt and possibilities for a character change through 
exercises in virtuous life? One should therefore concede that the issue of luck 
and determinism has not been ﬁ nally resolved in Plato’s philosophical system. 
What emerges here is a framework in which fate, i.e. everything that takes 
place outside the human being, does not necessarily aﬀ ect the unalterable core 
(the soul) which is thus able to achieve control of its desires and impulses. 
It also seems that a predetermined sequence of external events may be inter-
preted by humans as accidental. Consequently, people committing bad deeds 
are not guilty. It thus follows that Plato did not discuss separately the topic 
of whether morality can be modiﬁ ed under the inﬂ uence of luck and whether 
luck can impact the moral evaluation of people’s actions. It was only Aristotle, 
Plato’s disciple, who noticed that human happiness linked to virtuous life may 
have an eﬀ ect on external factors, accidental factors included.
III. Luck in Aristotle’s philosophy
Aristotle analyzes the good not in the contemplation of the abstract Pla-
tonic idea of the good but rather in the categories of happiness (Greek eudai-
mone). Achieving luck is largely dependent on human eﬀ orts: 
For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired 
by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue 
of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the 
gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely 
god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would 
perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness seems, however, even 
if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learn-
ing or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize 
and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike 
and blessed. It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are 
not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of 
31 Platon, Państwo, 617 C-E, tr. W. Witwicki, Kęty 2003, footnote 16, p. 337.
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study and care. But if it is better to be happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable 
that the facts should be so, since everything that depends on the action of nature is 
by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any 
rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to 
chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement.32
Aristotle writes that a negative response to the role of luck in being happy 
“… is plain also from the deﬁ nition of happiness; for it has been said to be 
a virtuous activity of soul, of a certain kind”.33 Nonetheless, he notes that 
evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or 
not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use 
friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the 
lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beau-
ty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless 
is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had 
thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As 
we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition.34 
The quote is about happiness (Greek eudaimonia), so Aristotle recognizes 
that being happy depends on the operation of fate. Happiness was not equat-
ed solely with pleasure – it was also associated with being ethical: the road 
to happiness was deemed to be paved with virtue: “with those who identify 
happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to 
virtue belongs virtuous activity”.35 However, the accomplishment of virtue is 
dependent not only on the character traits of a given individual, but also on 
external factors. And the latter are not always subject to the control or agency 
of human powers. 
The problems of happiness and the impact of luck in the Aristotelian view 
are discussed in-depth by Nussbaum. She highlights that according to the Sta-
girite life experience changes juvenile traits from good to worse, which may 
impact further conduct. Sample passages from Rhethoric indicate indisputably 
that character is correlated with age.36 According to Nussbaum, the fragments 
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, book I, part 9, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
nicomachaen.1.i.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016]. 
33 Ibid.
34 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, book I, part 8, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
nicomachaen.1.i.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
35 Aristotle, EN, p. 91. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, book I, part 8, http://clas
sics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.1.i.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
36 “Such, then is the character of the Young. The character of Elderly Men-men who are past 
their prime-may be said to be formed for the most part of elements that are the contrary of all these. 
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show that even when speciﬁ c virtues of character are achieved and exercised, 
the vicissitudes of fate make them diﬃ  cult to maintain.37
Nussbaum’s line of argument in the context of the debate on moral luck is 
summarized by Nelkin.38 She argues that Aristotelian luck operates in at least 
two ways: 1. Firstly, one becomes a virtuous person by undergoing the right 
kind of upbringing and training (exercising of virtues). Whether one receives 
the upbringing/training or not is at least to some extent beyond one’s control. 
Therefore, the ability to live a virtuous life depends on luck. 2. Secondly, the 
practice of virtues, i.e. the precondition for becoming a virtuous individual, 
depends to a certain measure on life circumstances.
What follows is that being happy also depends on whether someone has 
had an opportunity to practise virtues. For example, to be generous, one needs 
to have resources to share, and someone to share them with. Certain elements 
of life are thus a matter of luck – especially circumstantial luck – so the value 
of one’s life also depends to a degree on things that are beyond one’s control. 
As Nelkin points out, in some interpretations of Aristotle luck enters the pic-
ture in yet a third way. In order to be happy, humans need a minimum set of 
external goods (in addition to virtues), such as health, security, access to mate-
rial resources. Their role is broader than just to facilitate virtuous life. The key 
aspect is that they themselves are capable of creating luck.39 
In her summary of Aristotle’s position on luck, Nussbaum concludes that 
being virtuous is not a suﬃ  cient prerequisite for the goodness of living. Since 
life requires an active approach, there is a risk of violating moral sensitiv-
ity. Consequently, a person may succumb to external factors and become “dis-
lodged” from eudaimonia itself.40
Aristotle’s views on the connection between the moral value of human be-
ings, their happy life and luck is also linked to the concept of disposition. The 
They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and often made mistakes; and life on 
the whole is a bad business. The result is that they are sure about nothing and under-do everything. 
They «think», but they never «know»; and because of their hesitation they always add a «possibly» 
or a «perhaps», putting everything this way and nothing positively. They are cynical; that is, they tend 
to put the worse construction on everything. Further, their experience makes them distrustful and 
therefore suspicious of evil. Consequently they neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but following 
the hint of Bias they love as though they will someday hate and hate as though they will someday 
love. They are small-minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires are set upon noth-
ing more exalted or unusual than what will help them to keep alive” – Aristotle, Rhetoric, tr. W. Rhys 
Roberts, book II, part 13, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.mb.txt, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
37 C.M. Nussbaum, Luck and Ethics, in: D. Stateman, Moral Luck, New York 1993, p. 99. 
38 D.K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edi-
tion), ed. E.N. Zalta), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/moral-luck/, [ac-
cessed: 23.02.2016]. 
39 T. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford 1988, p. 445. 
40 C.M. Nussbaum, Luck and Ethics, op. cit., p. 100.
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disposition for action (Greek hexis) is a key constituent of virtuous action. 
Repeatable good actions both determine and corroborate the permanent nature 
of “goodness” in a given entity. Nevertheless, the permanence must rely on 
the readiness for action, i.e. disposition. It represents the moral residuum – the 
very essence of morality. What is at stake here, however, is not permanence 
itself, but rather the permanence of orientation on the good, in a manner that is 
voluntary, conscious and aimed at the good itself.41 Nussbaum notes that dis-
positions may never emerge without action. One of the problems which is not 
resolved in a ﬁ nal manner in the Aristotelian philosophical system is whether 
dispositions are able to persist in a given individual without action. If not, an 
inactive individual would lose the dispositions.42 The problem is beyond the 
scope of the present study, however if such a relationship between virtue and 
action were to be accepted – along with the additional premise that action takes 
place in a variable world – it would follow that the existing circumstances 
impact not only the eﬀ ects of human actions but even the potential for being 
virtuous or the lack of it. It can thus be concluded that Aristotle accepted the 
possibility that luck might aﬀ ect the moral assessment of human  actions, even 
though this question was never addressed by Aristotle as a separate philosoph-
ical problem. 
Although the philosopher recognized the status of luck, he seemed not to 
notice a theoretical contradiction between luck and the possibility of being 
virtuous. This is clearly visible in the discrepancy between the cited statement 
about the implausibility of the view that happiness depends on luck and the 
simultaneous incorporation of the role of circumstances which are independ-
ent of a given entity. The fact that the problem is not thoroughly analyzed by 
Aristotle is pointed out by Andre and Williams.43 
41 “Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts 
have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but 
if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not fol-
low that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he 
does them; in the ﬁ rst place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose 
them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a ﬁ rm and unchangeable charac-
ter” from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. 
Stevenson, Web Atomics. World Wide Web presentation is copyright (C) 1994-2000, Daniel C. Ste-
venson, Web Atomics, book II, part 4.
42 C.M. Nussbaum, Luck and Ethics, op. cit., footnotes 22 and 23, pp. 106-107. 
43 Williams Bernard Postscript State University of New York Press 1993, pp. 251-252; A. Ju-
dith, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, State University of New York Press 1993, pp. 126-128.
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IV. Luck in the Stoic philosophy
Fate, and digniﬁ ed human conduct in the face of fate, rank among the core 
subjects of the Stoic philosophy. The discussion below does not incorporate 
a distinction between the ancient Greek and Roman, and early, middle and late 
Stoics. An in-depth analysis of the problem would probably exhaust the scope 
of a separate monograph. In view of the above, the considerations regarding 
the Stoic philosophy in general, as presented below, involve a certain degree 
of overgeneralization. 
In the anecdote mentioned by Diogenes by Laertios, Zeno of Citium – the 
founder of the Stoic school of philosophy – appears to support the idea of 
determinism of human fate: “We are told that he was once chastising a slave 
for stealing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, «Yes, and 
to be beaten too», said Zeno”.44 Zeno’s views, Bobzien and Jedan argue, are 
deterministic in character.45 Nonetheless, the determination does not mean that 
penalties or awards should be abolished. 
Destiny – predetermined fate – is viewed by the Stoics in two ways. In 
one, classically Greek, which is manifest in Homer’s works or in Sophocles’ 
tragedies, fate reveals itself to individual people (idea of personal fate). Ac-
cording to this vision, “certain landmarks in individual lives and in human 
history are preordained: a victory, a hero’s return home, an illness, someone’s 
murdering his father, the date of one’s own death”.46 However, the necessity 
and preordination of fate do not signify the lack of moral autonomy. Quite the 
opposite, preordained fate is a proper context for it to reveal itself.47 As Origen 
writes about the Stoic philosophy: 
the philosophers of the Porch, who, not amiss, place man in the foremost rank, 
and rational nature in general before irrational animals, and who maintain that 
Providence created all things mainly on account of rational nature. Rational be-
ings, then, as being the principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in 
the womb, while irrational and soulless beings hold that of the envelope which is 
created along with the child. I think, too, that as in cities the superintendents of 
the goods and market discharge their duties for the sake of no other than human 
beings, while dogs and other irrational animals have the beneﬁ t of the superabun-
44 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. R.D. Hicks, book VII, chapter I, Part 
23, Harvard 1972, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.025
8%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
45 S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, pp. 16-58; Ch. Je-
dan, Stoic Virtues. Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Virtues, New York 2009, p. 31. 
46 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues. Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoics Ethics, op. cit., 
p. 31. 
47 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues, op. cit., p. 32.
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dance; so Providence provides in a special manner for rational creatures; while 
this also follows, that irrational creatures likewise enjoy the beneﬁ t of what is 
done for the sake of man”.48 
The primacy of moral goods logically overshadows any external goods – 
health, charm, or even life itself. As Jedan points out, destiny – or human fate 
– were a natural consequence of the polytheistic view on the divine being as 
a power exterior to humans and thus exerting only a limited inﬂ uence on their 
fate.49 What ensues is that fate and destiny are external factors which are not 
always consistent with the human will and desires, and do not exhaustively 
describe the way of achieving the end or ﬁ nal outcome which is predestined. 
One example of the relationship between freedom and fate thus perceived can 
be found in the words spoken by Cleanthes in The Enchiridion of Epictetus: 
“Lead me, Zeus and Destiny, wherever you have ordained for me. For I shall 
follow unﬂ inching. But if I become bad and am unwilling, I shall follow none 
the less”.50 In the passage, fate and destiny do not interfere with people’s will 
and their desires. As Jedan notes, “nonetheless, the resolution of the human 
agent will be immaterial to the ﬁ nal outcome, which is preordained: even if the 
agent is unwilling, the outcome will be the same”.51 In line with this vision, 
Socrates would have died even if he had escaped from prison and refrained 
from drinking a mixture containing poison hemlock – provided that his des-
tiny was to die. In the second meaning, destiny encompasses the entire reality 
(Bobzien deﬁ nes it as “all-embracing”52). It is no longer the question of per-
sonal fate but the destiny which, after being chosen by a god, logos or nature, 
applies to everything and in a permanent manner: “God is one and the same 
with Reason, Fate, and Zeus he is also called by many other names”, as Zeno 
states in the treatise On the Whole.53 The idea that the whole reality is control-
led by the divine logos causes that fate is a manifestation of providence. As 
Jedan notes, the theological determinism of the Stoics is less disconcerting 
than the contemporary mechanistic determinism derived from Laplace. The 
48 Origen, Contra Celsus, tr. F. Crombie. From Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 4, ed. A. Roberts, 
J. Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe. (Buﬀ alo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885.) 
Revised and edited for New Advent by K. Knight, book IV, chapter 74, http://www.newadvent.org/
fathers/04164.htm, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
49 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues, op. cit., p. 32.
50 Epictetus, Enchiridion, part 53, from: A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philoso-
phers, Cambridge, 1987, vol. 1. 62B. 
51 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues, op. cit., p. 32.
52 S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford 1998, p. 84. 
53 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. R.D. Hicks, book VII, chapter I, Part 
23, Harvard 1972, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.025
8%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
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former involves the idea of divine providence aimed at the good of the world 
and the human beings.54 Jedan argues that it is the goodness of the all-con-
trolling logos/god or fate that made the Stoics adopt the idea of all-embracing 
determinism.55 According to Chrysippus the all-embracing fate “is a certain 
natural everlasting ordering of the whole: one set of things follows on and 
succeeds another, and the interconnexion is inviolable”.56 As Aurelius asserts, 
people exist at the point of intersection of a combination of causes: “whatever 
may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implica-
tion of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that 
which is incident to it.”.57 Jedan notes that even though Chrysippus introduced 
the other understanding of fate, the original one was nevertheless present in 
his thought.58 
Also, attention should be given to the fact that the concatenation of causes 
and eﬀ ects diﬀ ers in the Stoic version from the aspects emphasized by Hume 
which were later adopted in the Western culture. To diﬀ erentiate between the 
real and magical causality, Hume mainly pointed to the temporal sequence 
which must be repeatable and irreplaceable.59 The vision relies on linearity 
and the succession of causes and eﬀ ects, where causes produce eﬀ ects that 
themselves become causes for subsequent eﬀ ects. The Stoics, Meyer asserts, 
did not recognize the temporal reversal of causes and eﬀ ects, but spoke of 
their simultaneity and the reciprocity of causes.60 They also excluded the ne-
cessity of the eﬀ ect becoming another cause. Hence fate and destiny are noth-
ing else than this reciprocal and simultaneous interaction. Searching for the 
answer what motivated the Stoics to embrace a broader vision of providence 
and destiny, it seems ﬁ tting to refer to Aurelius’ alternative between chance 
and providence: “recall to thy recollection this alternative; either there is prov-
idence or atoms, fortuitous concurrence of things; or remember the arguments 
by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political community, 
and be quiet at last”.61 
The alternative between the Stoic world governed by reason and the Epicu-
rean world ruled by the movement of randomly connecting atoms is resolved 
54 Ch. Jedan, Stoic Virtues, op. cit., p. 34.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 32.
57 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book X, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
58 Ch. Jedan Stoic Virtues, op. cit., footnote 6, p. 34.
59 S.S. Meyer, Chain of Causes. What is Stoic Fate?, in: R. Salless, God and Cosmos in Sto-
icism, Oxford 2009, pp. 76-77. 
60 Ibid., p. 74.
61 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book IV, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
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by Aurelius in favour of the world that is structured rather than condemned to 
the chaos of randomness. As mentioned above, a world controlled through the 
reason of nature or deity heads towards the good, which is undeniably a less 
disturbing and more optimistic option compared to the vision of a world ruled 
by accident. The argument that convinced Aurelius to adopt this outlook on the 
world was the order he saw in a part of the surrounding reality. Extrapolating 
it to the entire universe, he inferred that it had to be governed by providence 
rather than random collisions of atoms. He noted that “either it is a well-ar-
ranged universe or a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But can a cer-
tain order subsist in thee, and disorder in the All? And this too when all things 
are so separated and diﬀ used and sympathetic”.62 The ontological resolution 
also has an ethical dimension, for it delineates the things that one should adopt 
as guiding posts while living in such a world. What is important for the line 
of argument presented here, however, is the fact that recognizing the status of 
providence and the established order completely rules out luck as a separate 
causative power inﬂ uencing the general state of aﬀ airs. 
Even though it was recognized by the Stoics as more adequate and “hu-
man-friendly”, is the vision of all-embracing providence not more diﬃ  cult to 
reconcile with the freedom of will and responsibility than Zeno’s personal fa-
tum? In the other concept, the will would seek freedom despite – or in opposi-
tion to – the interactions of fate that are external to the agent. What is more, 
the discontinuity of the interaction would suggest that every human being is 
governed by free will on a daily basis, and is not predetermined. No less im-
portant is the fact that the eﬀ ect of destiny does not involve the person’s will 
and desires. Meanwhile, in line with the concept of all-embracing fate, no as-
pects of the reality (including longer or shorter moments) may be outside the 
concatenation of mutually interconnected causes that are preordained by the 
logos/destiny or god. However, the Stoics did not espouse the idea that humans 
lack the freedom of choice – including the crucial distinction between good 
and evil. In one of key passages, known only indirectly, Chrysippus notes that 
the person who pushes the cylinder – and thus gives it a principle of motion – 
represents the original cause of the cylinder rolling.63 The person that pushes 
the cylinder and actually makes it roll provides the “proximate” cause and 
turns the cylinder’s fate into actuality. Nonetheless, as Athanassoulis writes, 
fate is not the same as determinism because the pushing person does not need 
to turn the potential “rollability” of the cylinder into actuality.64 A similar view 
is shared by Bobzien who argues that the pushing of the cylinder in Chrysip-
62 Ibid.
63 Cicero, On Fate, 41, cf. 9, 21, 23, 31. 
64 N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, New York 2005, p. 91.
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pus’ writings does not mean that the person succumbs to external pressures or 
forces. The person pushes the cylinder out of their own volition which, how-
ever, does not signify that it contradicts destiny. What Chrysippus advocated 
was a compatibility between determinism (all-embracing fate) and free will. 
One of the critics of that approach was Plutarch who claimed that determin-
ism and free will were mutually contradictory.65 Chrysippus did not view the 
freedom of will in the categories of the freedom to “act otherwise”, which 
would assume an inner freedom to act otherwise, but rather as the “autonomy 
of the agent”. In this framework, autonomy refers to actions that are free from 
coercion and outside pressures.66 Therefore, he advocates the position that is 
contemporarily referred to compatibilism or soft determinism, and attempts to 
reconcile the contradictions mentioned above. People are thus responsible for 
their actions, and for what they become.67 Consequently, even though people 
are one of mutually interconnected elements of the world having a predeter-
mined impact, they retain their freedom. Nevertheless, a question arises as to 
whether the awareness of choices, and the possible reluctance about acting in 
accordance with what reveals itself as the good, are beyond the inﬂ uence of 
destiny. A certain incongruity is thus apparent there, or the inability to disen-
tangle theological determinism from the freedom of action. From one perspec-
tive, actions should be beyond the impact of fate. From another, however, if 
the position were to be accepted, fate would not be all-embracing. Obviously, 
death or other natural necessities are beyond the decisions of will, provided 
that one awaits death without accelerating it through suicide. In the face of 
such determinism, human freedom is limited to accepting the inevitable and 
refraining from putting up resistance. 
Expounding this aspect of the deterministic vision of reality, Zeno and 
Chrysippus compared the human condition to that of a dog tied to a cart. In 
this metaphor, the dog may run after the cart, if it wishes to. However, if it 
does not want to, it will be dragged by the cart anyway.68 Retaining free choice 
which is independent of fate but limited to a change of attitude on the predes-
tined course of things appears to create a tiny margin of freedom. The problem 
is that, as the Stoics believed, freedom comes down to accepting necessity 
and, going further, adopting a personal attitude which embraces that which is 
necessary. In that framework, it needs to be added, necessity is a corollary of 
the predetermined course of things which head towards the good. Recognizing 
65 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, in: idem, Moralia, tr. Ch. Harold, London 1976, vol. 
XIII, Part II, pp. 369-603.
66 S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoics philosophy, Oxford 2003, s. 335n.
67 R.J. Hankinson, Determinism and indeterminism, in: The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy, ed. K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schoﬁ eld, Cambridge 2008, pp. 529-541.
68 Hippolit Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, tr. H. Arnim, Leipzig 1921, vol. III, p. 191.
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necessity is thus a good thing, so that freedom is conceived of as reorientation 
towards the good and the pursuit of it. This concept is accepted by St. Tho-
mas Aquinas, to name but one example. Aquinas believed that being free was 
equivalent to the choice of actions that were consistent with the objective good. 
A question arises whether the necessity to accept the only possible action – to 
ﬁ ne-tune one’s soul to necessity which is predestined without any human con-
tribution – cannot be viewed as a speciﬁ c restriction and a form of pressure. 
One way to bypass the problem is to acknowledge that predestined necessity 
is a non-debatable issue, as its primary nature delineates the very domain of 
freedom. This, however, does not seem an entirely satisfactory solution. It may 
be comforting, but at the same time leaves the feeling of a certain deﬁ ciency. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that Chrysippus’ attempt, as Bobzien 
notes, was not aimed solely at recognizing human freedom but also people’s 
responsibility for their deeds. 
Importantly, the Stoics focused not only on the question of being moral-
ly responsible but also on the possibility of inner transformation. As Seneca 
writes in one of his letters to Lucilius: 
No man can have a peaceful life who thinks too much about lengthening it, or 
believes that living through many consulships is a great blessing. Rehearse this 
thought every day, that you may be able to depart from life contentedly; for many 
men clutch and cling to life, even as those who are carried down a rushing stream 
clutch and cling to briars and sharp rocks. …Therefore, encourage and toughen 
your spirit against the mishaps that aﬄ  ict even the most powerful.69
It needs to be highlighted, therefore, that the Stoics recognized a possibility 
of inﬂ uencing – and transforming – one’s inner states. Since that was deemed 
feasible, perhaps not everything was preordained by providence, and its all-
embracing understanding had certain boundaries. The possbility of changing 
inner states actually turns out to play a central role in becoming reconciled 
to necessity and following its commands without question – or even with joy 
– on the one hand, and protecting oneself from the impact of accident on the 
other. This approach builds upon the premise of the agency of human subjects 
and their decision-making powers, which also implies their moral responsibil-
ity. It is the establishment of one’s thinking about the world, imperviousness to 
emotions and self-control that acquire the status of moral obligations. Marcus 
Aurelius’ arguments in favour of the existence of order in the world, and hence 
the existence of providence, are not entirely convincing (there is no order in 
someone else, to so per analogiam to the view espoused by the philosopher-
69 Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, tr. R. Guemmere Mott, in: A Loeb Classical Library edi-
tion, vol. I, Harvard 1917, letter IV. 
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emperor the world is not controlled by providence). What is more, from the 
human perspective anything can be regarded as an accident or necessity. In 
both possible versions of the world, however, people should be governed by 
their reason and virtues. Quoting Aurelius, “In a word, if there is a god, all is 
well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be governed by it.”.70 As Seneca 
notes, people can make themselves independent of fate through virtue: 
All injury implies a making less of that which it aﬀ ects, and no one can sustain an 
injury without some loss either of his dignity, or of some part of his body, or of 
some of the things external to ourselves; but the wise man can lose nothing. He 
has invested everything in himself, has entrusted nothing to fortune, has his prop-
erty in safety, and is content with virtue, which does not need casual accessories, 
and therefore can neither be increased or diminished; for virtue, as having attained 
to the highest position, has no room for addition to herself, and fortune can take 
nothing away save what she gave. Now fortune does not give virtue; therefore she 
does not take it away. Virtue is free, inviolable, not to be moved, not to be shaken, 
and so hardened against misfortunes that she cannot be bent, let alone overcome 
by them”.71 
Fate is understood here as the general human fate composed of necessities 
and aspects which, from the human perspective, are incidental. In a similar 
vein, Aurelius suggests that being a wise man, that is adherence to the Stoic 
lifestyle and virtues, on the one hand helps people to reconcile themselves to 
necessity and, on the other, makes them independent of luck, fortune or acci-
dent, as seen from the human point of view. 
The two understandings of fate, destiny or providence create a stage where 
the problem of freedom of human decisions may be played out. The older con-
cept, conﬁ ned to concrete occurrences, gave gods a possibility to inﬂ uence 
human fates in an on and oﬀ  manner, occasionally, leaving them with consid-
erable leeway to engage in voluntary acts. Inspired partially by the desire to 
attain a vision of the world which is more caring towards rational beings, the 
extension of the scope of providence presented the Stoics with the problem 
of space to be accommodated by free human decisions – with the focus on 
freedom, as opposed to accidentality. Human decisions are meant to be ra-
tional, which is why human beings become rational causa sui to themselves. 
As can be seen, they identiﬁ ed an inner space within humans in the possibility 
of their transformation from beings that are torn by emotions induced by the 
70 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book IX, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
71 Seneca, On the Firmness of the Wise Man, from: L. Annaeus Seneca, Minor Dialogs To-
gether with the Dialog “On Clemency”, tr. A. Stewart, London 1900, book II, part V.
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outside world into the stability and independence of reason – or in virtuous 
self-suﬃ  ciency. An interesting aspect is that the very same rationality which 
had weaved the fate of the world in such a way that it became a predetermined 
and necessary system of causes and eﬀ ects inside a human turns into a seed 
that bears the fruit of liberation from the yoke of determinism. The liberation, 
however, is preplanned as the only path to be genuinely happy independently 
of the frequently hurtful and destructive eﬀ ects of good-oriented providence.
Comparing the attempts to reconcile human freedom with the predeter-
mined world, as outlined above, it must be noted that one of them is to conﬁ ne 
the freedom to people’s inner actions and the other to view will and determin-
ism as non-contradictory due to the fact that the operation of free will is not 
about the choice of an alternative but rather about being free from inner com-
pulsion. The second solution, which is evocative of contemporary compatibi-
lism, does not mention the lack of free will outright, but implies it, shifting the 
understanding of the freedom of will into the domain of inner compulsion. The 
ﬁ rst solution, by giving the freedom of choice, nonetheless conjures up the 
thought that only one part of the alternative represents the appropriate answer. 
An inappropriate answer causes that people are dragged by their fate as a dog 
tied up to a rolling cart – instead of joyfully and peacefully following the in-
evitability of their destiny. Whether these attempts defend themselves against 
Plutarch’s charge of contradiction is another issue which would be resolved by 
a more in-depth analysis of the Stoic views. Such an analysis, however, is not 
essential for the purpose of the present study. 
The diﬃ  culties faced by the Stoics with respect to the freedom of will and 
determinism are not the only ones. Yet another thorny issue is the attempt to 
integrate fate with the occurrence of luck. The ﬁ rst point that needs to be ad-
dressed in this vein concerns the meaning of the notion of luck. Seneca in his 
treatise Of Clemency writes that “we have all of us sinned, some more deeply 
than others, some of set purpose, some either by chance impulse or led away 
by the wickedness of others; some of us have not stood bravely enough by our 
good resolutions, and have lost our innocence, although unwillingly and after 
a struggle; nor have we only sinned, but to the very end of our lives we shall 
continue to sin”.72 
Indirectly, the above passage suggests that a person may be guilty through 
accident but, at the same time, there are people who have been exonerated 
of their guilt precisely because it was accidental. What this seems to imply 
is that Seneca could not make up his mind as to whether those who commit 
a bad deed are culpable or not. One of the passages contained in The Medita-
72 Seneca, Of Clemency, tr. A. Stewart, Book I, part VI, from: L. Annaeus Seneca, Minor Dia-
logs Together with the Dialog “On Clemency”, London 1900, pp. 380-414. 
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tions deals with human actions: “ﬁ rst, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without 
a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end”.73 
An accidental human action does not serve any purpose. The postulate stems 
from the recognition of life governed by reason as an ideal. In a similar vein, 
Aurelius notes that “In the things which thou doest do nothing either inconsid-
erately or otherwise than as justice herself would act; but with respect to what 
may happen to thee from without, consider that it happens either by chance 
or according to Providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse 
Providence”.74 
Therefore, as the emperor-philosopher claims, luck happens in the world. 
Nevertheless, certain additional statements are required here. Above all, how-
ever, luck does not determine diﬀ erences in being happy, contrary to what was 
claimed by Aristotle. Aurelius writes: 
Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse? 
But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the power to 
guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe 
has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either 
through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscri-
minately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour and dis-
honour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good men and bad, 
being things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither 
good nor evil.75 
Also, a point needs to be made that Aurelius seems to recognize the idea 
of fate as all-embracing. Secondly, at least in Hadot’s interpretation, Aurelius 
completely rejects luck as a possible alternative to providence. He also enu-
merates several potential sources of occurrences: “And either the universal 
intelligence puts itself in motion for every separate eﬀ ect, and if this is so, 
be thou content with that which is the result of its activity; or it puts itself in 
motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner; or 
indivisible elements are the origin of all things”.76 
73 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book XII, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
74 Ibid.
75 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book II, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
76 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book IX, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016]. Hadot illustrates the cited passage with a sche-
matic which shows the separation between the main alternative components: providence and luck; 
compare P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, tr. Ch. Michael, London 
1998, p. 152.
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Importantly, the list is consistent with Seneca’s approach, as Hadot points 
out77. Seneca’s account, however, is extended by the idea of impersonal provi-
dence. The aspect is disregarded here, for it is not relevant to the problem 
of luck. What, then, is luck? What can be an event outside the concatenation 
of mutually interacting causes? Can it also be a cause originating beyond the 
world planned by the logos? If a positive answer were to be given to the two 
questions, it would mean consent to another contradiction in the Stoics’ con-
ception – in addition to that suggested by Plutarch – related to luck operat-
ing independently and unexpectedly in a completely predetermined world. In 
a two-valued logic concerning the world which is conceptually anchored in the 
common-sense framework, such a combination is not possible. The only way 
out of the conundrum is to accept that luck, as Seneca and Aurelius write, is 
an event determined by fate which is recognized as luck solely from the per-
spective of human consciousness, as it was completely unnecessary or point-
less. The luck is thus relative. This interpretation is also corroborated by the 
passage: “All that is from the gods is full of Providence. That which is from 
fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and involution 
with the things which are ordered by Providence”.78 
Therefore, there are many arguments in favour of the assumption that the 
Stoics viewed luck as a sequence of events which, in objective terms, are an 
outcome of a planned intervention of providence, but from the subjective hu-
man perspective are something unnecessary and pointless. 
In this context, the question should be raised whether luck, or accident, 
may impact human fate. Secondly, it needs to be considered whether in the 
Stoic view luck may inﬂ uence morality and, if so, whether the Stoics ad-
dressed the problem of moral luck. The answer to the problem of potential 
interference of luck with human fate has already been given. Nonetheless, 
it should also be said that luck is luck by reason of the human ignorance of 
causation, or failure to predict it, rather than because of a rift in the predeter-
mined concatenation of causes and eﬀ ects. What thus emerges is – subjec-
tively – called luck.
In an attempt to resolve the issue of the impact of luck on morality, one 
may draw on the study by Athanassoulis entitled Morality, moral luck and re-
sponsibility. The author argues that the concept proposed by the Stoics, simi-
larly to the views propounded later by Kant, fails to incorporate the premise 
that luck may impact morality.79 As opposed to Aristotle, they did not believe 
77 P. Hadot, The Inner Citadel. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, op. cit., p. 149. 
78 Aurelius Marcus, The Meditations, tr. G. Long, book II, http://classics.mit.edu/Antoninus/
meditations.10.ten.html, [accessed: 01.12.2016].
79 N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, New York 2005, p. 82. 
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that luck could be aﬀ ected by external goods such as excellent health, honour, 
social respect, wealth or successful oﬀ spring. As Seneca reﬂ ects:
What, then, is such a soul? One which is resplendent with no external good, but 
only with its own. For what is more foolish than to praise in a man the qualities 
which come from without? And what is more insane than to marvel at characteris-
tics which may at the next instant be passed on to someone else? A golden bit does 
not make a better horse. …No man ought to glory except in that which is his own. 
…Suppose that he has a retinue of comely slaves and a beautiful house, that his 
farm is large and large his income; none of these things is in the man himself; they 
are all on the outside. Praise the quality in him which cannot be given or snatched 
away, that which is the peculiar property of the man. Do you ask what this is? It is 
soul, and reason brought to perfection in the soul. For man is a reasoning animal.80
Luck was conceived of by the Stoics as the rule of reason over emotions, 
which was meant to lead to a virtuous life. Virtue, on the other hand, was 
 neither gradable nor losable. The Stoics regarded self-suﬃ  ciency based on 
virtue alone as an ideal of morality. In opposition to Aristotle, however, vir-
tue is not associated with feelings in the Stoic system. Even more than that, 
it is a consequence of being controlled exclusively by reason which has ef-
fectively mastered the control of feelings. Theoretically, then, in the Stoic 
concept, emotions should not succumb to external inﬂ uences, which is why 
a virtuous person is free from the eﬀ ects of some outside factors, as Aurelius 
suggested. Potential accidental events must not, therefore, aﬀ ect humans by 
stirring up emotions. Human beings ought to adopt apatheia as their ideal. 
In this theoretical framework, luck does not inﬂ uence morality. This does not 
mean that every proponent of the Stoic school succeeds in being immediately 
and entirely independent of the eﬀ ect of stirred-up emotions and thus ensure 
that accidental factors will not have a bearing on the moral evaluation of their 
acts.81 Moral luck, as mentioned above, may be implicated both in the eﬀ ects, 
circumstances and the moment constituting a given person in their physicality, 
character, social background, etc. These types of luck exemplify interactions of 
external and accidental factors aﬀ ecting human life which either make people 
guilty or morally virtuous. In Athanassoulis’ view, the postulated resistance to 
emotions is intended to prevent the operation of accident and situational luck, 
for it improves self-control.82 By the same token, the indiﬀ erence towards ex-
80 Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, op. cit., letter XLI, parts 6-8.
81 Compare N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, op. cit., pp. 82-90. 
82 Athanasoulis in her studies uses the term of developmental luck which is broader in scope 
than situational luck – see N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, op. cit., 
p. 173, footnote 35.
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ternal goods (as opposed to internal goods including virtue, apatheia or self-
suﬃ  ciency) suggests that the central focus is on the state of the mind, spirit 
and emotions. That state should not be under any inﬂ uence of outside factors 
enumerated above. In the ideal state postulated in the Stoic theory external 
factors may not impact action in such a manner as to change the moral assess-
ment of the agent’s activities. Circumstantial luck, situational luck, or even 
constitutive luck do not, then, have a theoretical impact on the evaluation of 
human actions. 
Through their focus on self-suﬃ  ciency and independence of emotions, the 
Stoics implicitly regarded the skill of self-control as a key determinant of be-
ing a good and happy person.83 
Whether the Stoics reﬂ ected on the control requirement as a precondition 
for moral responsibility is a separate problem. An analysis of the source mate-
rials fails to yield a clear resolution. Hence, even though the Stoics noticed the 
impact of luck on human life, though not on morality (at least theoretically), 
they were unable to provide an account of the problem of moral luck such as 
has been done contemporarily. What Athanassoulis also notes is that the Stoic 
theory also rejects, though not expressis verbis, the eﬀ ect of resultant luck. 
This is achieved by basing the assessment of actions not on their outcome but, 
primarily, on the agent’s state of the mind and intentions while performing 
a given action. The right state of mind is more important than the action itself. 
As Athanassoulis points out, a Stoic wise man is morally responsible for the 
state of his spirit, mind and feelings, and is capable of controlling them, for 
they pertain to his inner self. No person is responsible for that which happens 
outside them.84 Evoking the ﬁ gure of the Stoic sage is meant to put into focus 
the fact that the only path to attain independence of external factors, includ-
ing accident, is to become a sage through mastering the virtue of apatheia and 
the rule of reason (as, for example, in Aurelius’ reﬂ ections on the dilemma 
summarized above). It can thus be concluded that the practice of the Stoic 
philosophy is an instrument of becoming independent of the eﬀ ect of accident 
potentially interfering with inner states. 
Although the Stoics made no outright declaration to that eﬀ ect, it can be 
assumed after Athanassoulis that they would also negate the problem of moral 
luck as impossible to occur. The above would, naturally, would hold true for 
the sage. However, what about those still practising or, for that matter, those 
that have not yet become familiar with the Stoic proposal at all? Could such 
a person’s deeds be subjected to any moral assessment despite the occurrence 
of an accidental event inﬂ aming emotions and inducing uncontrollable anger? 
83 N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, op. cit., p. 87.
84 Ibid., p. 89.
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The gradual pursuit of virtue means that a person becomes progressively inde-
pendent of such chance external occurrences. Therefore, before the attainment 
of complete independence, accidental interactions aﬀ ecting the agent may not 
only modify the agent’s deeds but also the moral evaluation of eﬀ ects produced 
by such deeds. It may take the form of manifestation of defects in character, 
which may happen precisely in the context of accidental occurrences. The same 
point is made by Athanassoulis: time needed to take control of one’s feelings is 
a period when accidental external interactions come to the fore, and desires and 
inclinations may be stimulated.85 It appears, then, that there is a possible inter-
pretation of the Stoic philosophy in which the problem of moral luck is plausi-
bly incorporated. The problem would pertain to those that have only just begun 
to cultivate virtue in themselves. If the interpretation of the Stoic thought is 
justiﬁ ed, it follows that the problem of moral luck was, for some reasons, over-
looked by the Stoics, despite it being logically valid. Athanassoulis argues that 
the Stoic system simply passes over the problem, and the Stoics’ “response to 
moral luck is not so much a solution, but a refusal to acknowledge the problem 
altogether by removing morality from the sphere of luck”.86 
According to the author, the Stoic thought has a number of inconsisten-
cies – or insuﬃ  ciently resolved issues. They are the “price” paid by the Stoics 
for their attempt to build a theory of morality which would comprise egalita-
rism, self-suﬃ  ciency and independence of external factors. One of the conse-
quences is the contradiction existing between the statement of self-suﬃ  ciency, 
generality and rationality of every human being with respect to the pursuit of 
virtue and the simultaneous suggestion that it is necessary to provide moral 
education to young people.87 What the above indicates is that morality is not 
self-suﬃ  cient. In addition, its quality may be dependent on the inﬂ uence of 
educators, their morality and abilities. Athanassoulis notes that another way in 
which the Stoic concept of morality pays for the attempt outlined above is the 
lack of concordance with the everyday observation of the human condition. 
For example, not all people are equally rational. To compound the problem, 
the Stoics are unable to explain the underlying origin of vice.88 After all, hu-
mans are born good. Where do evil traits come from, then? Is the phenomenon 
attributable to luck? This gives rise to the question whether the Stoics pro-
posed an ethical theory which is excessively idealized, and discordant with 
reality.
85 N. Athanassoulis, Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility, op. cit., p. 97.
86 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
87 Ibid., p. 96.
88 Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines, 5.5.8-26, in: A.A. Long, and D.N. Sedley, 
The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge 1999, p. 415; J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 
New York 1993, p. 5.
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Going further, this means that they assume free will which is not deter-
mined, and freedom to experience and reason which are not driven by the ne-
cessity of fate. 
V. Concluding remarks
The overview of positions given above reveals that the problem of impact 
of luck on the moral assessment – or morality – of an agent performing actions 
is addressed in a number of ways. The Stoics negate such an impact. The same 
view is shared by Plato. Aristotle, on the other hand, notes that the impact ex-
ists. The interaction, however, is not addressed in any depth as a separate phil-
osophical problem. Also, the accident and its operations is not seen as a threat 
to morality as such – or a risk to the concept of moral subject. This is perhaps 
associated with the fact that the attribution of moral responsibility and moral-
ity fail to be conceptualized as a separate category. Even though they were 
deﬁ ned as preconditions for the discussion of morality, they were not singled 
out conceptually and reﬂ ected upon separately.
The diﬀ erence in the notions and concepts used can also be noticed in the 
problem of determinism. The Stoics claimed that while human fate could be 
determined by gods or nature, the same was not true for human will. The Stoic 
philosophers had no knowledge or tools that might commit them to the view 
that will is determined biologically. In the contemporary debate on determin-
ism, certain aspects which would have been unthinkable to the Stoics seem, at 
least to some measure, justiﬁ ed. 
Still, the diﬀ erences do not change the fundamental assessment that some 
ancient philosophers perceived the impact of luck as an evident phenomenon 
which had to be given an explanation. Plato pointed to the operation of luck 
rather in the world of ideas – while Aristotle and the Stoics drew attention to 
it in the earthly reality. To Aristotle, luck was not given by gods. The Stoics, 
however, held a diﬀ erent view. These varying stances on the matter served 
as points of reference for later philosophers. A particularly notable position 
was taken by Kant, who linked morality to will, just like the Stoics, in order 
to separate morality from accidental interactions. Nagel and Williams investi-
gated the interconnection between luck and morality focusing on the question 
whether such separation is excessively arbitrary. Deﬁ nitely, the relationship 
between morality and luck has not been ultimately resolved, and warrants fur-
ther studies. 
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THE PROBLEM OF RELATION BETWEEN LUCK AND MORALITY 
IN SELECTED ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
S u m m a r y
The article presents views of selected philosophers, from antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, on luck and its role in morality. It shows that, for example, Plato did not con-
sider moral luck. Aristotle did but without such concequences as Williams and Nagel 
did. Stoics also considered morality as independent from the fortune provided that the 
wise man is able to become independent from luck. In the ancient times, the role of 
luck or fate was undoubtedly perceived but not theorized. 
The luck was not the reason for the question of the meaning of moral responsi-
bility.
Keywords: luck; moral luck; Plato; Aristotel; Stoics; Thomas of Aquin; Williams; 
Nagel
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